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This project will examine the impact of Post-World War II era capitalism on the
resources, people and communities of the Pacific Northwest generally and The Dalles,
Oregon specifically. I have chosen The Dalles in part because it is my hometown but
also for its national significance. The Dalles is considered to be the end of the Oregon
Trail as well as a resting point for travelers on their way to other areas of the Pacific
Northwest. It has been a place where those passing through take what they want and
leave everything else behind. In The Dalles as in much of the West, federal officials and
private capitalist investors in search of profit have severely depleted or destroyed the
natural resources of the area. After these resources have become less lucrative the
industries often leave the people, who have begun to rely on industry, to face the
uncertainty of unemployment. Some towns simply could not adapt and with no other
industry basically dissolved. Others were “fortunate” enough to have a new capital
interest move in and develop another industry to replace the one that was lost. It is the
ability of The Dalles to fall back on local agricultural resources as well as its location on
the Columbia that has made it able to survive when many other towns “busted out.” The
purpose of this project is to better understand the role of federal and private capitalism in
the West as well as to examine the local impact that these investment booms and busts
have had on The Dalles, Oregon. The focus period will include the period of the Second
World War, through the Cold War to present day The Dalles. This time period was one
of increased militarization and increased external investment in the West, which created
an environment of instability and reliance on external capital for employment.
During the period of the Great Depression the federal government diverted the
majority of federal funds designated for developing the U.S. infrastructure to the Western
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United States. This capital was used by the Federal Bureau of Reclamation to create
more viable farmland in the arid West through irrigation projects. The Army Corps of
Engineers used a large portion of this federal capital in constructing dams and creating
roads. These projects followed president Roosevelt’s New Deal with the philosophy that
the economic development of the West would be best achieved with federal funds and
projects directed at utilizing the untapped resources in the West. These resources were
the hydroelectric potential of the many large rivers like the Columbia and the large
expanses of land that if irrigated, would be usable by farmers. 1
During World War II the federal government continued to direct capital
predominately to the Western United States. The Army Corps of Engineers began
building the Hanford Nuclear Facility to produce plutonium for the atomic bombs, which
would eventually be dropped on Japan at the end of the war. The Corps stepped up the
building of dams to provide the massive energy needs of the Hanford Facility as well as
to provide energy to other industries crucial to the war effort. The aluminum industry
along the Columbia River was especially important as it produced a great deal of the
aluminum needed to make the military aircraft that the Boeing plant in Seattle,
Washington produced. The federally funded projects that had been underway during the
Great Depression were expanded and developed more quickly during World War II. The
end of World War II brought a rapid influx of labor similar to after World War I.
Federal policymakers were concerned that such a rapid increase in labor without enough
jobs to employ them could result in a second depression. In response the federal
government continued many of the wartime militarization projects and federal capital
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also went to fund additional projects that would create more jobs while building an
infrastructure to facilitate further modernization in the West. 2
Postwar programs such as dam building in the Columbia Basin and irrigation of
arid land for farming created jobs and brought increased wealth and population to the
region. These programs also aided in the Cold War militarization of the U.S. by fulfilling
the energy needs of both private industry and federal nuclear facilities. The aluminum
industry operated in the Columbia basin to produce the aluminum needed to continue to
produce military vehicles, aircraft and explosive ordinance parts. The nuclear facilities
like Hanford depended on massive quantities of power to operate and the dams of the
Columbia Basin produced the power. The irrigation projects brought more farmable land
into the agriculture system, which created more food for the country and brought more
people and income into the U.S. West. But with the economic and military success came
many social and environmental problems. With the booms in population and wealth
came the busting of towns and people as resources dried up and projects finished. These
boom and bust cycles created a system of instability and dependence on outside capital
for sustenance. This is because many of the more traditional local resources such as
salmon, lumber and farming had been degraded or destroyed by the federal and state
programs and private industries seeking their own externally-defined agendas. Because
of this many towns in the West were forced to deal with rapid increases and decreases in
population, employment and changes in the landscape and resources caused by both
federal and state government as well as private capitalist ventures.
Historians have examined this topic of capitalism in the U.S. West in many
different ways. In The End of Victory Culture, published in 1995, Tom Englehardt
2
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chooses not to focus specifically on the impact of federal and private capital in the West
but rather on the popular beliefs that helped to bring this capital to the region. Englehardt
finds that a majority of Americans were disillusioned about the West and that this
provided the catalyst and opportunity for increased federal and private capital
involvement in the West. The popular national beliefs concerning the West during the
1940’s and 50’s were of a wild under-productive area of the U.S. in need of
modernization, population and utilization to serve the national good. Hollywood’s
portrayal influenced popular ideas of the West as a place of savage Indians, great hidden
wealth, and far behind the “civilized” nature of the Eastern U.S. According to Englehardt
the United States history of military successes in both the first and second World Wars
added to the national feeling of U.S. superiority. In order to maintain U.S. superiority the
country needed to continue to fund military advancement indefinitely. The fear of
communism aided this belief in continued support of militarization as it created a
common, invisible national threat that the U.S. must always be ready to fight. The
political and cultural values of the Cold War era were formed out of Wild West imagery
and disillusioned public beliefs of U.S. superiority. These beliefs developed out of the
many military victories of the U.S. beginning with the Revolutionary War to the victory
in World War II, which began to emphasize the growing militaristic culture of the U.S.
This is demonstrated by the militaristic nature of post-World War II children’s toys like
GI Joe and the increasing appearance of toy guns for children to play war with. 3 This
emphasis on militaristic culture made it possible for the federal government to have
public support for continued military production during peacetime.
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Englehardt’s main thesis is that in order to understand how and why the modern
West came to be, it is necessary to consider the national ideologies that pushed federal
and private investment forward. He acknowledges that capitalism played a significant
role in changing the face of the West from its agricultural and natural resource base prior
to the New Deal era, into a modernized and largely military-focused production force.
However, he takes his search a step further by attempting to find out what made this
possible. According to Englehardt, it was the political and cultural values such as the
disillusioned belief in US superiority, the Manifest Destiny driven Frontier mentality as
well as the media’s portrayal of the “Wild West” which provided the catalyst. 4 To
support this argument, Englehardt examines the role that the media as well as capitalism
played in spreading these ideals across the country. Books as well as movies spread the
disillusioned ideas of what the West was across the country. One example of this that
Englehardt uses is the portrayal of Indians as cruel savages who would ruthlessly scalp
and kill white women and children to fulfill their thirst for blood.5 These as well as other
popular portrayals of the West were completely inaccurate. However the manufactured
images of what the West was were more widespread and accepted as true than the reality.
This cultural disillusionment provided the backdrop for the acceptance of federal
as well as private capitalist projects because many Americans believed that the
superiority of the U.S. was in danger after the Red Scare, and difficulties in Korea and
Vietnam. This made the people in the West as well as the rest of the country more
willing to accept the federal militarization and private industrialization projects, which
were seen as a way to help the west and the nation as a whole. This made it possible to
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shape the West so that it resembled the myths that portrayed an expansive landscape full
of resources needing to be extracted as well as an empty and unproductive landscape that
could serve the needs of the federal government’s military and atomic programs. Tom
Englehardt argues that it was the disillusioned national beliefs of what the West was and
should be that allowed for the massive influx of Federal and private capital during the
20th century. This differs from Richard White’s interpretation as White chooses to focus
on how national beliefs influenced politics and capitalism development in the Columbia
Basin.
In The Organic Machine, published in 1995, Richard White examines the impact
of politics and capitalism on the Columbia Basin. He argues that the environment of the
Columbia River has not been destroyed but rather modified to produce resources other
than the salmon it once had. However, there have been continual efforts by both fishers
and biologists to preserve salmon by instituting expensive and largely unsuccessful
programs. These programs such as barging the baby salmon around the dams and using
hatcheries to produce salmon avoid addressing the central problem. The dams along the
Columbia River have changed the river from being able to sustain and produce salmon to
producing hydroelectric energy. The fishers, biologists, federal agencies like the Army
Corps of Engineers and state agencies such as Oregon Fish and Wildlife that create and
run these projects to save the salmon have made decisions time and again that are
counter-intuitive to this goal.
The architects of the new river have been nearly constant in their protestations of
concern for salmon, but they have quite consciously made a choice against the
conditions that produce salmon. They have wanted the river and its watershed to
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say electricity, lumber, cattle, and fruit and together these have translated into
carp, shad, and squawfish instead of salmon. 6
White argues that the river’s ability to produce has not been destroyed but rather
modified to support the needs of capitalism in its many forms. During World War II
national defense projects used most of the electricity produced at the dams along the
Columbia River and its tributaries. In turn the national defense projects provided
employment opportunities and an industrial base for the region. The dams produced
electricity, which was used by aluminum mills, and they in turn supplied the materials to
produce aircraft needed in the war.
The war forced new priorities. The aluminum industry continued to use roughly
half of the electricity produced by the dams. Aluminum was essential to the war effort as
it was used to build everything from airplanes to atomic bomb parts. Instead of
producing salmon the dams modified the Columbia River to produce the electricity for
the aluminum plants to produce the aluminum needed in aircraft construction for the
military. The war department of the Federal Government controlled the aluminum
industry before and during World War II and during the wartime production increases
and essentially hijacked the Columbia River. This became clear as demands for defense
aluminum declined in the postwar period. However, because aluminum was essential to
national defense it was maintained by electricity subsidies into the 1980’s. 7 In order to
meet this constant demand and the growing public demand for electricity, the Army
Corps of Engineers began to build more dams under the orders of the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) and Bureau of Reclamation. The Columbia now was modified even

6

Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking Of The Columbia River (New York: Hill And
Wang, 1995), 90.
7
White, 72,73.

9
further to produce more electricity to compensate for the constantly growing public
electricity needs which grew from the proliferation of electric powered lights and
appliances increasingly present in the homes of local people. The continued
modernization and industrialization of the post-World War II Columbia Basin led to an
increase in the electricity needs of the local populations. This caused a conflict between
the huge energy demands of the Aluminum companies like Harvey Aluminum in The
Dalles, which was necessary for National Defense, and the needs of the local population.
Aluminum production was not the only industry reliant on and impacting the
Columbia River. Hydroelectricity production also made building the Hanford Nuclear
facility possible. This federally funded project did not simply redirect the production
capabilities of the Columbia Basin away from salmon with the new dams needed to
supply it with electricity. As White notes “Hanford was allowed to release more than
685,000 curies of iodine 131 into the environment during its first three years of
operation.” 8 The purposeful Green Runs of 1949 released mass quantities of Iodine 131
into the air, water and soil. These tests were done as the Hanford facility was rushed by
news of the first successful Soviet atomic bomb detonation. The plant managers,
technicians, and scientists allowed this radioactive release to speed plutonium production
and neglected to inform the communities affected because they claimed, “Plutonium
guarded American Freedom”. 9 This release of radioactive material complicated the
natural systems of the Columbia Basin. This material could not escape the environment
or people it came in contact with and further complicated the organic hydroelectric
industrial machine that the river has become. A great deal of federal capital and local
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resources like land, materials, and hydroelectric power went into creating Hanford and
even more wealth and labor will go into confining the radioactive waste it produced
which, cannot be eliminated, it can only be contained.
Richard White argues that the Columbia has become a human-created organic
machine, which is managed without being fully understood. Development and industry
have largely destroyed the once bountiful salmon and replaced it with a network of
hydroelectric dams and hatchery fish. The pollution created by Hanford has killed many
people and will continue to threaten the health of the river and those who use it for many
years to come. The efforts by the Bureau of Reclamation to create farmland out of desert
by paying landowners to irrigate their land and irrigating previously unusable lands to
become farmable led to an agricultural surplus and the need to subsidize crops to keep
them profitable. White lists the negatives such as these “to mirror and counter the selfcongratulatory propaganda that still stems from the various miracles that arose at the
Grand Coulee, Hanford and in the Columbia Basin”. 10
According to Richard White, the Columbia has become a set of separate spaces to
those that use it. Fishers see habitat, farmers see irrigation and industry sees the energy
needed for production. No matter the group each stakes a claim to their part of the river
without concern for the river as a whole. It is this division of space and neglect of the
whole, which has led to the drastic changes in the production capabilities of the Columbia
River. 11 Richard White examines federal capital in the Columbia Basin and the
conflicting interests of fishermen, conservationists, private industry and Federal policy in
how to manage the resources of the Columbia River. White is careful to spread the
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blame evenly and not simply point the finger at the federal government or private
industry. His main argument is that the Columbia River has been modified and is now
managed in a way that is counterintuitive to conserving the traditional resources of the
river. The river has been changed by human action and inaction and in order to properly
care for the river we have to understand what we have created. The unwillingness of
those people managing and using the river to see the whole river system has caused a
sectioning of the river. The narrow view and efforts to conserve certain sections fails to
acknowledge that whatever impacts one part of the river also impacts the whole river.
The Columbia River is now an experiment in mankind’s ability to manage a once-natural
system that has been modified to produce new resources like electricity, while attempting
to keep natural resources like salmon viable.
Richard White’s examination is very different from that of Robert E. Ficken’s
article, “Grand Coulee and Hanford: The Atomic Bomb and the Development of the
Columbia River,” because Ficken focuses mainly on the actions of the federal
government whereas White is examining the ecological changes that resulted in the
Columbia. 12 Ficken examines the role that Grand Coulee and Hanford had in the
development of the Columbia River and the atomic bomb. The building of the Grand
Coulee dam was initially going to be a locally built and maintained operation run in the
interest of the people of Big Bend, Washington. However, Secretary of the Interior
Harold Ickes, in charge of funding allocation for the project, insisted that it be taken over
by the federal government. Upon its completion in 1941 the output of Grand Coulee was
supervised by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), which worked counter to the
12
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local feeling that power produced locally should go to local consumers first and
inexpensively. These federal dams hijacked the resources of the local communities and
the energy was sold at a flat rate throughout the Columbia Basin. The dams like Grand
Coulee and Bonneville were advertised to the local communities as a way to receive low
cost electricity and agricultural irrigation. In the case of both of these dams the local
communities ended up paying the same amount for electricity as everyone else. The
massive size of the Grand Coulee Dam combined with the terrain of rolling hills made it
nearly impossible to irrigate the land its boosters had promised the local farmers.
The electricity produced by these massive dams was boosted as a benefit to the
local communities but in reality served to provide low cost electricity to attract
manufacturers to the Pacific Northwest. “Inexpensive power more than offset the
inconvenience and cost involved in transporting raw materials essential to the production
of aluminum from distant sources of supply”. 13 The aluminum industry was not the only
significant consumer of Columbia River power. The Hanford Nuclear facility consumed
all of the surplus power generated by the Grand Coulee dam. The combination of the
aluminum industry and Hanford’s extreme energy requirements put the existing
Northwest power network under a great deal of strain. The BPA pushed the federal
government to build more dams to produce additional energy and take some of the
burden from the already strained power network. These plans were stepped up as the
nation entered World War II and militarization began in the West.
The massive wartime defense spending in the West brought rapid industrial,
economic and population growth to the region. This continued into the postwar period as
federal defense spending continued in the West. By 1955, five new federally funded
13
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dams came online to provide the booming post-war industries with needed power. The
dam built at The Dalles on the Columbia River had been planned during the war but was
found unfeasible because the plans were for it to be large enough to create an inland lake
larger than Puget Sound but it was feared that this would flood Hanford upriver. 14 The
federal planners, who designed the dams like Grand Coulee, did so not out of necessity
but as a show of U.S. superiority. The dams along the Columbia and other rivers in the
Pacific Northwest were conceived to protect local interests from outside domination, but
instead they developed as U.S. property created and operated by the Bureau of
Reclamation and subject to the marketing policies of the Bonneville Power
Administration. For the local people this meant that the dams had become a part of the
modern military-industrial complex devoted to aluminum and plutonium production
before agriculture, milling, and irrigation. 15 Ficken’s conclusion is that although the
dams were conceived to serve the local communities and assist them in attracting more
permanent industries, Federal and BPA policy devoted them primarily to military
supporting industries.
William G. Robbins focuses on the role of private capital investment in the
development and exploitation of the West in the article “The Plundered Province Thesis
and the Recent Historiography of the American West.”16 He does not dispute the large
role of the federal government but argues that private capital investment in the West was
also very significant. Robbins addresses the post World War II portrayal of an
economically liberated West able to move beyond reliance on Eastern capital by
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concentrating defense industries, the rise of Bank of America for subsidized loans and the
growing political power of the Southwest. 17 He disagrees with this description of the
evolution of the West and argues that the externally invested capital into the west in the
20th century did little to liberate the west or break its reliance on external capital.
According to Robbins, investment capital from the eastern US, England, and Europe
made the extraction of Western resources possible during the 20th century. He refers to
this as “a form of exploitation imposed from outside due to limited indigenous capital.
Because of this external investment, most of the profit went outside the region to the
investors.”18 This extraction of resources and profit out of the West caused communities
to become dependent on externally funded capital projects for income such as the many
dams and new military industries like Boeing and the aluminum industry. Problems arise
when the projects finish and move elsewhere, leaving the local communities without
resources or jobs.
This is illustrated when one examines the once thriving lumber industry in the
Pacific Northwest. The lumber was extracted in large part for sale nationally and
internationally and the local communities were left with large expanses of deforested
area. Once this industry became more restrictive and less profitable, the lumber
companies fired workers, closed mills and severely cut back production. Many
companies were externally funded by their headquarters located in the Eastern U.S. or
even outside the U.S. These companies were run by industrial strategies and decisions
made outside the region and were only concerned with the profitability of the resources
they extracted. Once the resources are gone or become unprofitable, the project ends or
17
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moves on. Although Robbins’ focus is not Cold War specific in its examination of
capitalism in the West, it is pertinent to the Cold War as many private companies such as
Boeing and Northwest Aluminum produced products for the military during the Cold
War.
Another source significantly relevant to the issue of federal and private capital
shaping the modern West is the 1999 book by Gerald D. Nash titled The Federal
Landscape. In this book Nash examines the ways that federal programs and projects
shaped the landscape of the West from 1900 until 2000. According to Nash:
It was the federal government that determined the pattern of farms in the humid
regions, built the major roads and highways, and fostered the growth of the
principal cities in the West. The federal government built the large dams and
diverted important river systems throughout the West, determined the shape of the
large military reservations and their environs… In short the federal government
created a federal landscape in the West. 19
Nash argues that the federal government was not the only force in the West but it was the
most dominant. Federal capital invested in the West during the twentieth-century made it
possible for private industry to begin operating in the West. Nash also argues that the
monetary and fiscal policies of the federal government during the twentieth-century did a
lot to stimulate entrepreneurial activity in the West.
In Nash’s view the New Deal era of the 1930’s and 40’s marked a concerted
effort by the federal government to provide the plans and badly needed investment capital
to provide greater economic diversification and industrialization in the West. The main
goal of this was to help the national economy recover from the Great Depression. By
investing in the West the federal government hoped to boost employment, develop the
West, and access the untapped mineral and hydroelectric resources that had yet to
19
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produce. Nash quotes the Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to provide the Federal
perspective on what was needed in the West. “The future of the West depends on greater
diversification and a wider use of its resources through development of industries located
close to those resources.”20 The need to develop the Western U.S. came from the belief
that the West up until the New Deal Era had been treated more like a colony that had
endured a history of natural resource extraction. This belief guided the New Dealers to
try and make things right by diverting a majority of federal capital into developing the
West for mining, agriculture and industry.
The projects to build hydroelectric dams were implemented by Harold Ickes and
the Bureau of Reclamation. “These were the perfect projects to correct nature and make
it more productive.” 21 According to Nash the projects of the Bureau of Reclamation
along with other Federal agencies were guided in the 1930’s by the belief that humans
were superior to nature. The Bureau advertised the dams to the local communities as a
way to store water, allow irrigation of the area surrounding the dams, provide flood
control and produce inexpensive local electricity. River navigation was also made more
practical with the introduction of dams with shipping locks. The two largest projects on
the Columbia River, built by the Army Corps of Engineers, were the Bonneville Dam
built from 1933-37 and Grand Coulee built from 1933-1942 Dam. The New Deal
planners felt that the building of the Bonneville Dam east of Portland, Oregon was ideal
because it served multiple purposes. The Dam would “produce electric power, develop
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irrigation, improve navigation of the Columbia River, expand tourism, and attract
manufacturing and other industries.” 22
The coming of World War II increased federal investment in the West to about
$60 billion from 1940 to 1945, more than in the entire New Deal Era. 23 The creation of
wartime jobs brought millions of people to the Pacific Northwest. According to Nash the
federal government set the parameters and goals for the private enterprises in the West to
follow in mobilizing the Western economy for war. Aluminum production was crucial to
the manufacture of military vehicles, explosives and supplies and so a great deal of the
hydroelectric power generated in the West was dedicated to this industry. To meet
wartime demands for aluminum the federal government invested over $200 million to
build more aluminum plants and additional dams were built to provide the massive
amounts of electricity needed to make aluminum. Agriculture, mining and oil production
also stepped up production to meet the growing demands of the military. “The war
provided a direct impetus to the expansion of manufacturing industries in the West,
particularly aircraft fabrication, shipbuilding and steel, aluminum, and magnesium
production. Shipbuilding alone provided about 400,000 new jobs and built more than
2,000 ships. 24 The end of World War II meant the return of the approximately 15 million
military personnel to the U.S. job market. This would flood the job market and could
lead to another depression if nothing was done. Federal policymakers followed the
guidance of the prominent economist John Maynard Keynes who believed that in order to
avoid another depression large-scale government spending would need to continue until
the private-capital spending could catch up. Federal defense manufacturing plants were
22
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sold off to the private sector at rock bottom prices in an attempt to keep the economy of
the West moving.
Nash’s central argument is that the involvement of the federal government in the
West was shaped by a perceived need to intervene and fix the West. The federal
government acted as the prime investor and supervisor in the building of the modern
West. Private capital did have a significant impact as well but as in the case of the
aluminum industry, without the federally-built dams there would not have been an
adequate supply of electricity for these private industries to operate. Federal capital held
the lead role in building the needed infrastructure for private capital to exist on a large
scale.
Nash’s examination of federal and private capital in the West focuses broadly on
the overall impact, which differs from Michael Admundson’s approach in examining the
local impact on the mining town of Jeffery City, Wyoming in his article “Home on the
Range No More: The Boom and Bust of a Wyoming Uranium Mining Town, 19571988.” 25 Amundson also looks at the Cold War period’s influence in creating a market
for mining and refining uranium for the federal nuclear projects in the West. However,
his approach is significantly different in that he focuses specifically on how national
policy impacted both private capital and a local community in the West.
Amundson argues that the capitalist control of Jeffery City, Wyoming by Western
Nuclear as well as the town’s one-dimensional dependence on mining uranium created a
cycle of boom and bust following the uranium market fluxuations and eventually
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bottomed out.26 Western Nuclear is the company that built and controlled the town of
Jeffery City to provide a place for the workers it would employ to live. Bob Adams, a
restaurant owner, who heard about the money that could be made in the uranium industry
and wanted a piece of the action, created this company. He bought the Lost Creek Oil
and Uranium Company which he renamed Western Nuclear in 1957 and established
Jeffery City. Jeffery City began as a small mining community but as the uranium market
began to boom, Western Nuclear put more money into making Jeffery City permanent by
adding schools, better housing, and infrastructure.
However, the market changes that made Jeffery City possible were controlled by
the Atomic Energy Commission, which controlled the national uranium market from the
1940’s on, and Jeffery City’s existence relied on the AEC providing a stable and lucrative
uranium market. The policies and programs of the AEC ensured a constant domestic
supply of uranium at low prices for both federal and eventually private nuclear power
facilities to buy. The federal government’s control of domestic uranium developed out of
a congressional fear that due to the small known world supply of uranium and the
Soviets’ successful nuclear test of 1949 the United States might not have enough uranium
to meet long-term needs. Because of this, congress implemented a national program to
help boost domestic uranium supply and ensure federal and eventually private nuclear
power access to that supply. However, the federal control of the uranium market caused
boom and bust phases for the uranium mining towns that developed due to changes in
federal nuclear policy and world markets, Boom periods created problems in housing,
schooling and stressed the minimal infrastructure of the small resource based towns in the

26

Amundson, 505.

20
West. The bust phases, “struck at the very existence of these towns.” 27 Jeffery City was
one of these towns that were unable to survive the bottoming out of the uranium market
and dependence on employment by Western Nuclear.
Amundson argues that federal concern over access to the world’s small supply of
uranium prompted federal policy changes to control the U.S. market in order to ensure
access. In the early 1950’s the supply of uranium, an essential component in the atomic
bomb, was small, and developers feared that a sufficient and continual supply might not
be available for U.S. atomic weapons production. Congress linked government and
private uranium companies together to find and mine new domestic sources of uranium to
meet federal supply demands. This program was supervised by the Atomic Energy
Commission which had been created to “control the production, ownership, and use of
fissionable materials to assure the common defense and security” of the United States. 28
This program ensured that supply, would always be accessible to the government by
“creating financial incentives for the exploration and manufacture of uranium from new
fields.” 29 These federal policy changes and programs created a resource market that
companies such as Western Nuclear sought to supply. This in turn created a need for
labor and company towns such as Jeffery City were created to support the labor force
with adequate housing, infrastructure, employment and eventually schools. Jeffrey City’s
future was tied to both its uranium resource and a viable market in which to sell that
resource. The AEC was relying on private power plants to be developed and boost the
demand for uranium ore. However, by 1962 it became apparent that private nuclear
development was not progressing quickly enough and the uranium supply was far
27
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exceeding government demand. The AEC attempted to keep the domestic industry alive
by reducing the amount of ore it would purchase each year from the contracted
companies like Western Nuclear, and extending the contract length. The AEC also put an
embargo on foreign uranium to help lessen the supply of uranium. These changes forced
the 1972 merger of Western Nuclear with Phelps-Dodge, an international copper
company. 30 The new company continued to invest in improving Jeffrey City by planting
trees, building new houses as well as other improvement projects.
The oil crisis of the 1970’s along with a change in federal uranium enrichment
policy led to an increase in the price of all fuels based on their BTU rating, which in the
case of uranium, caused the price to jump from $8 per pound to over $40 by 1977. 31 This
led to a population boom in Jeffrey City and helped pull Western Nuclear to its feet.
Although the town had begun in 1959 as just a “place to survive while working, by 1979
the town had become a hometown in which people could work and live. 32 Many small
businesses moved into the town such as barbershops, banks and even a Montgomery
Ward. However, since these businesses were basically service based they could not
survive without the local population. The uranium market was dealt a major blow with
the Three Mile Island incident in March of 1979. This forced new regulations and forced
existing nuclear plants to install costly safeguards and put facilities in construction on
hold. These companies dumped the uranium they had stockpiled back into the disturbed
market and it collapsed.
With the crash of the federally controlled uranium market in the early 1980’s,
Western Nuclear, Jeffrey City’s most significant source of employment, was forced to
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sell out and leave, as uranium was no longer profitable. Massive layoffs followed and the
majority of the town’s population was forced to move elsewhere for employment. The
few remaining people left in Jeffery City were left with the prospect of nuclear waste
cleanup as the only real, although short term, employment left. Amundson explains that
the swift nature of Jeffery City’s demise was due to its dependency on uranium as well as
being a community controlled by the external forces of federal policy, which determined
the uranium market’s viability. He ends by arguing, “Jeffery City was doomed from the
beginning because its extractive economy was not regenerative and its survival relied on
a boom-and-bust industry, which was externally defined and controlled.” 33
Englehardt, White, Nash, Ficken, Robbins and Amundson examine how federal
policy, guided by disillusioned national beliefs, influenced both federal and private
capital investment in the 20th century West. The main differences in their interpretations
involve the ways that they each approach this topic. Englehardt examines popular culture
as a potential factor in the rapid increase of both federal and private investment in the
West. White chose to examine the impact of externally controlled capital on the river and
the management decisions and beliefs that have been counter to the salmon-producing
river of the past. Both Nash and Ficken argue that the federal capital invested in the West
during the 20th century paved the way for private capital. Robbins differs from Nash and
Ficken in that he chooses to examine the impact of private, externally controlled capital
while acknowledging that the federal government was a major factor as well. The article
by Amundson is the only one of these sources that examines the impact that externally
controlled local resources and federal government policy changes had in a local
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community of the West. Amundson’s approach provides a model for examining The
Dalles, Oregon.
Cold War federal policy was based largely on disillusioned popular national
beliefs played out through the media. Much of the federal involvement in the American
West during the Cold War and Vietnam focused on atomic weapons and energy
production. Industries such as the hydroelectric industry in the Columbia Basin and
uranium mining and refining were crucial to nuclear weapons production. But, how has
this development impacted the people and communities of the Pacific Northwest and why
have some been able to survive the boom and bust cycles where others have not? An
examination of The Dalles, Oregon, a small town in the Columbia Gorge, provides a case
study with historical significance not only for the West but also for the entire country.
The area and the people have historically experienced capital, goods, and people
“just passing through.” The Dalles first served as a meeting point for Native Americans
of the Columbia Gorge area to meet, socialize and trade. This occurred before the
incursion of Europeans into the West and may have lasted for hundreds of years. The
Dalles is also significant to the travels of Lewis and Clark who camped there on their
journey to the Pacific. It is the site of Fort Dalles and it marks the end of the Oregon
Trail. The gold mining industry flooded into the Columbia Basin with the discovery of
gold deposits near Fort Colville in the 1850’s. “Because of its location at the head of
navigation in the Columbia Gorge, The Dalles became the outfitting point for the mines.
Many merchants moved to The Dalles during this gold mining boom to establish stores
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and extract all the wealth they could.” 34 This caused an era of general affluence and
population boom within the town. The Dalles had become a symbol of prosperity and
wealth and relied entirely on gold mining for this status. Problems began to arise in the
late 1860’s as the “gold fields of Idaho and Montana and Eastern Oregon began playing
out. The Dalles had depended entirely on the mining industry, and when it left so did the
major economic attribute.” 35 With the depletion of gold mining in the region, The Dalles
was forced into a bust period marked by low job availability and a larger population. The
search was on for another source of income for people of The Dalles. The Union Pacific
Railroad established Oregon’s first permanent railroad in 1863 in The Dalles to take
advantage of the need to transport large quantities of livestock and grain to market. 36 The
initial environmental impacts of the railroad were not as visible to the local people as
later industries would be. This was due in large part to the expansive nature of the
railroad. Local people only saw the part of the railroad that existed within the town and
this portion was responsible for transporting goods and people. The push to bring federal
programs into the west continued to escalate, driven by a belief that industry would bring
long-term wealth and prosperity to The Dalles.
John B. Appleton illustrates this one directional focus on the benefits and
complete lack of examination on the possible negative impacts in his article from the
1941 Geographic Review. Appleton’s article gives some insight into the way federal
programs were viewed in the 1940’s and illustrates an initial push by Western boosters to
34
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attract them. In his article titled “Migration and Economic Opportunity in the Pacific
Northwest,” Appleton looks first at the reason for the increasing population in the Pacific
Northwest during the 1940’s and then at the problems that this caused for the local
people. Appleton cites the labor shortage and large migration of people to the Pacific
Northwest after 1930 to argue the need for federal programs in this area. To support his
argument, Appleton cites various sources dealing with migration and population
estimates from researchers such as V.B. Stanbery and R. Wakefield. He also relies on
information from state and federal agencies such as the Montana Farm Security
Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to support his argument. His
evidence demonstrates that population density, migration numbers, and the USDA’s
report on the quality of the land that exists in the arid areas demonstrated that the
population grew between 1930 and 1939 by about 460,000 while the availability of good
farmland had declined. 37 After this he analyzes government reports on the Pacific
Northwest’s potential for production in various industries. Appleton finally ties his
argument for federal capital in the West together with a report by Portland General
Electric (PGE) that discusses hydroelectric potential of the Pacific Northwest and the
industry that cheap power could bring. Appleton used this data to try to win support for
federally sponsored projects in the Pacific Northwest.38 Appleton gave no attention to
preservation of natural resources or the impact that these projects would have in the
region, only to the benefits that federal dams would bring to the Pacific Northwest.
Unlike Appleton, George MacInko in his article “The Columbia Basin Project:
Expectations, Realizations, Implications,” has the luxury of hindsight in his examination
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as he focuses on the problems with the implementation of federal projects. 39 MacInko’s
article represents a shift towards questioning the actual benefits received from these
projects and comparing this to the problems that have occurred as a result. According to
MacInko, “issues such as cost, drainage facilities, size of farms and repayment of
construction costs are just a few of the problems that have been encountered.”40
MacInko focuses more on the governmental and environmental issues with irrigation
projects that took place in the Columbia Basin. MacInko suggests that the Grand Coulee
Dam was doomed to fail in its irrigation purpose from the beginning. The government
never intended the Grand Coulee Dam for irrigation. The dam was over-built to show the
power and ingenuity of the Federal Government. MacInko cites the unfeasible size of the
dam project, the massive costs of building the dam and the constantly decreasing size of
the land that the project designers claimed would be irrigated. Irrigation took a backseat
so that the size of the dam could be increased and the increased costs were then attributed
to problems in irrigating the rolling hill terrain of the area around Grand Coulee. 41 The
idea of providing irrigation was a tool to gain support for such a massive and expensive
project. MacInko does not discuss hydropower production or its influence in bringing
industry to the Pacific Northwest. His focus is on the Columbia Basin project’s failure up
to 1963 to bring adequate irrigation and farming to the area. The sources that MacInko
uses are similar in nature to those that Appleton utilized over twenty years earlier but
illustrates the problems that occurred over twenty years of implementation.
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The process of short-term economic boom followed by a bust period, which
caused a local push for a new industry, was repeated with the building of The Dalles Dam
in 1955. The dam was built in response to the increasing energy demands of the postwar
industrial West. The local newspapers covered the story of the dam project, focusing on
the positive and lucrative aspects of the issue. Little attention was paid to the impact the
dam would have on the Native Americans that relied on the salmon for sustenance. The
Dalles Chronicle raised only the issue of how much the government would compensate
Native Americans for the loss of their ancestral fishing grounds that would be flooded
out. 42 The Umatilla Indians attempted to fight the building of the dam and their protests
were included in the U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation, Columbia
River System Operation Review that outlined the project and any problems. The Umatilla
“argued that past ‘water-intensive’ industries made initial economic contributions but
have been stagnant for about 25 years. They also argued that sacrificing fish and their
habitat to ‘theoretically’ generate jobs and incomes in the ‘water-intensive’ industries,
eliminates jobs and incomes in other industries and reduces the economic welfare of
those who value fish and habitat.”43 Even with this opposition the dam was still
constructed.
The construction of the dam increased the need for labor and materials. Massive
amounts of concrete, steel, and wood would be needed in the building process. “The
major contract for building the dam went to the S.A. Healy Company of White Plains,
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New York, whose low bid of $4,888,600 for construction of a coffer dam and
powerhouse excavation was accepted on January 22”, 1952. 44 The Healy Company
brought in workers and machinery to the construction site quickly after its bid was
accepted. The powerhouse of the completed dam was designed to be about twelve stories
tall and span about half a mile. The material removed from the construction site was
estimated before construction to be about ten million cubic yards of rock and dirt. 45 To
prepare for the rapid influx of workers, the town hurriedly built school facilities, city
services, and other essential features such as temporary housing. 46 This quick building of
a weak infrastructure would take place again with the introduction of the Aluminum
productions facilities made possible by the dam.
Upon completion of the dam, the large work force of approximately 6,000
workers became unemployed. The construction companies like S.A. Healy had brought in
some workers but the majority traveled to The Dalles looking for employment and were
drawn there by the construction company’s need for additional labor. This over-taxed the
town and forced the people previously employed building the dam to seek other sources
of employment. The Harvey Aluminum plant was built in 1958 in response to the cheap
electricity generated by the dam and the favorable federally subsidized aluminum
production demands of the post-war era. During construction of the facility another influx
of workers occurred. The construction of the Harvey Aluminum plant employed a few
thousand workers. The long-term employment after construction was much lower,
employing a few hundred workers. The Aluminum plant became a major industry in The
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Dalles, providing employment for hundreds of workers. In a small town such as The
Dalles with a population of less than 13,000 residents, the boost in employment was
huge. By the late 1960’s local citizens were beginning to focus on the environmental
damage caused by the toxic aluminum plant waste and The Dalles Dam. The belief in
industry being a positive addition to the local economy had begun to shift as the toxic
waste damaged local crops. In 1963 20 fruit growers from The Dalles brought a lawsuit
against Harvey Aluminum, for damaging their crops by releasing 1,300 pounds of
fluoride iron into the air each day. The growers argued that this was very possibly a
major factor in the light cherry, apricot and peach crops of 1960. At the culmination of
the suit the Harvey Aluminum plant was ordered to install an air cleaning system that
would remove the contaminants from the vented air.47 It was not until 1972 that the
Martin-Marietta Aluminum Co. (formerly Harvey Aluminum Inc. until 1970) was
ordered to pay $1 million in reparation by the Oregon Supreme Court for damages to the
local orchard crops. The findings were that the plant was inappropriately located and its
air pollution emission control system was grossly inadequate, which allowed a cloud of
fluoride iron to settle in the orchards. This in turn inhibited pollination and soil damage,
which impaired fruit production. 48 The lawsuit was the first substantial push by residents
of The Dalles to hold the externally controlled capital accountable for damage to the local
resources.
The subsequent closing of the aluminum plant in the 1980’s led to a rapid exodus
of workers and a crash in the local economy. Martin Marietta closed the plant in 1984
due to profitability problems but leased the plant to Northwest Aluminum in 1986.
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Northwest Aluminum reopened it but only at a minimum production rate and by 1987
began to lay off workers because of low profits. 49 The spike in demand for electricity in
the late 80’s made it more profitable for Northwest Aluminum to sell off the electricity
they had contracted from the BPA than to produce aluminum. Northwest Aluminum
used the profits from the energy sales to continue to pay the wages of the workers they
employed so as to keep these workers available if the aluminum market changed. But the
market did not rebound. This was another step in the perpetual cycle that has been the
norm in The Dalles and many other communities of the west. The town has been left to
deal with the hazardous waste that was created by the aluminum plant.
When the Federal and private capital investments such as The Dalles Dam or
Martin-Marietta aluminum plant cut back employment or move on, the people of The
Dalles turn to the local agricultural and fishery resources for sustenance. Problems arise
when these resources have been polluted or destroyed. The ability of the inhabitants of
The Dalles to fall back on agriculture when an industry moves on or collapses made it
possible for the community to survive the multiple bust phases that had occurred up to
the 1970’s. Without the main industries or federal projects the town relies on the fruit
crops like cherries for which it is globally known, to seasonally support the workforce.
The salmon has also been a resource that many people in the community have been able
to rely on but with the implementation of The Dalles Dam, and increasing pollution from
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Hanford Nuclear Facility upriver and the Aluminum plant in The Dalles, salmon runs
have declined. 50
Increasing community awareness of the one-industry dependence, which had
developed in The Dalles on the Martin-Marietta aluminum plant during the 1980’s, later
Northwest Aluminum in the 1990’s, has led to attempts to diversify. This awareness of
the dangers in being a one-industry town was captured in the August 5th, 2001
Oregonian. The title says a great deal about the shifting local views: “Destination: The
Dalles. This Former One-Industry Town Where Eastern Oregon Bumps Up Against The
Rainy West Finds That Business Goes On After Aluminum.” According to the article:
“Local officials remain concerned about the area’s continued reliance on a single
industry--aluminum--and the impact of power prices and recent layoffs at Northwest
Aluminum in The Dalles. The shutdown of the local aluminum plant in the mid-1980’s
crushed real estate prices and sparked an exodus.” 51 In response to these concerns, The
Dalles has started to boost its connection to the past and its historical significance. City
beautification and improvement projects have worked to revitalize the appearance of The
Dalles. Murals of historic scenes decorate the sides of many downtown buildings. Many
new bike and walking paths along the Columbia River have also been installed to attract
visitors to the town. This is a step towards diversification of the local economy and away
from the constant instability of boom and bust. 52
Historians have examined the issue of federal, state and private capital in creating
the West we know today. The historiographic sources I examined point to the
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disillusioned national beliefs of U.S. superiority and the Cold War fear that this
superiority was in danger because of the communist threat. The lack of victories in the
Korean War and Vietnam War continued to feed this fear. This provided the opportunity
for local communities in the West to support the federal and private investment in the
West. These projects were largely operated from outside the region and sought only to
secure wealth, resources, and create a militarily productive West. The Dalles is one of
the Western communities where this took place. The Dalles Dam was built to provide the
energy needed for the defense necessary production of aluminum. These were built to
serve the agenda of the federal government and private industry but were promoted
primarily as a benefit to the local people. The positives like increased employment and a
boost in the economy were explained in detail and negative impacts were paid little
attention. My primary sources contain the regional views as well as the local views on
the impact that the federal and private capital investment has had on The Dalles. The
aluminum plant has been changed from a major source of employment for the community
to a superfund site of toxic sludge ponds and groundwater contamination only yards away
from the once clean Columbia River. Now it sits as an idle rusty eyesore built by
externally controlled capital but in the end, the community is left with a toxic waste site
that has not been cleaned up, but merely covered in an attempt to contain the waste. 53
The one thing that has helped the community of The Dalles to survive the many boom
and bust cycles it has endured is the ability to fallback on the agriculture on which the
community has relied for generations.
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The Dalles has been forced to adapt many times in this boom and bust cycle that
is commonplace in the West. Federal and private capital investment is just passing
through and it stops to take advantage of the abundance of one resource and then moves
on leaving The Dalles to deal with the waste, lack of specific resources, and an abrupt
decrease in jobs. From the standpoint of both private and federal capital, The Dalles has
been merely a tool they can use to extract or utilize whatever good they are after and
when done the tool is expendable. The one way that the community of The Dalles can
break this cycle is to continue to focus on what they have and promote that. This push
towards promoting the historic value of The Dalles and the current attempts to diversify
the local economy is a step towards changing the cycle. To prevent the constant
instability and waste that outside capital creates as it moves through, the community is
turning its focus to within the area.
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